NEVADA HISTORICAL SOCIETY QUARTERLY



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The Indian Massacre That Never Happened

SALLY S. ZANJANI

"THE APPLICATION OF A MATCH on a windy night would destroy the town, and then the people could be killed like rats in a hole," observed the editor of the *Walker Lake Bulletin* in January of 1891, suddenly fearful of Hawthorne's isolation in the "heart of the Indian country." Watchmen hired by the frightened townspeople began to patrol the streets.¹ Such apprehensions were not confined to Hawthorne. Military companies were also being formed in Bodie and the Mason Valley. The Reno Board of Trade and several newspapers called on Washington to dispatch federal troops to quell the anticipated hostilities with the Indians. An Elko County lawman telegraphed to Governor Roswell Colcord for arms, citing the dangers posed to settlers at Deeth and Wells by the Indians. Rifles and ammunition had already been shipped to Austin and Belmont. Settlers moved their families into the Belmont courthouse for safety and stood guard while the Indians gathered to conduct mysterious ceremonies in the Smoky Valley.²

The reason for this hysteria in the winter of 1890-1891 was the spread of the Ghost Dance religion among the Indians. Wovoka, or Jack Wilson, a northern Paiute born around 1856 and living in the Mason Valley near the Walker River Reservation, had risen to sudden prominence as the Ghost Dance Messiah. He preached to growing numbers of followers among the Nevada Indians and to visiting delegations from other tribes of his journeys to the land of the dead and the messages he had brought back from Numin'a, the Old Man who made the world. Wovoka's stature as a religious leader was further augmented by reports of the miracles he had performed, including the restoration of the sun following the eclipse of 1889 and the creation of ice in summer. During the winter of 1890-1891, the Ghost Dance excitement intensified because Wovoka had promised his followers that in the spring of 1891 the millennium would arrive. The grass would grow lush once more, the wild game would return to course the valleys, the old would become young, the dead warriors would live again, and Numin'a would destroy the white

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Wovoka, or Jack Wilson, was a northern Paiute who was considered the Ghost Dance Messiah. (Nevada Historical Society)

man and restore the world to the Indian. Many tribal bands, including some of the distant Sioux, were converted to Wovoka's teachings and adopted the Ghost Dance religion, with tragic results when nearly 300 Sioux men, women, and children were killed by the U.S. Cavalry at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota on December 29, 1890.³

While the history of Wovoka and his new religion and the debacle in the Sioux country have been ably described by many writers, one aspect of the Ghost Dance excitement, or the Messiah craze, as it was sometimes called, has received little attention. Historians have not yet examined the reaction of Nevada's white citizens and officials to the intensifying Indian unrest around them; and one of the most fascinating issues connected to the Ghost Dance excitement remains to be explored: why was the Ghost Dance Messiah's own homeland spared a tragedy comparable to Wounded Knee? The escalating tensions of the millennial winter suggest that Nevada swerved a good deal closer to confrontation than has generally been realized.

Several of the same combustible ingredients that produced the tragedy in the Sioux country were also present in Nevada, and in some ways the situation was even more dangerous. Nevada was, after all, the state where Wovoka resided and the place where his message probably found the widest and most ardent acceptance. From the Oregon border to the Moapa Valley, ponies were being rounded up, bands of Indians were on the move, and large Ghost Dances drawing hundreds of participants were convening. The press reported the Indians "well armed and very saucy." Some spoke of the ranches, homes, and stores that would soon be theirs; others deserted their jobs without explanation.⁴ Although Wovoka's teachings strongly opposed warfare with the whites, a homesteader forty miles from his nearest neighbor and fearful of the unrest around him was unlikely to draw much comfort from the fact that he was about to be annihilated by the divine intervention of the Indian gods rather than the Indians themselves. Moreover, the Sioux were not the only believers who had drawn a hostile message from Wovoka's teachings, and some Nevada Indians were thought to be sending warlike signals. In the Austin area, fears were aroused by rumors of a fanatical Indian preacher who had carried Ghost Dance doctrine far beyond Wovoka's words and was calling for battle against the settlers. Panic spread in the Mason Valley when an Indian let it be known that his people planned to steal the arms in the armory and burn the town. Even prospectors who had walked unmolested and unafraid with their burros through the lonely reaches of the desert for years found it advisable to head into town for the time being. The Nevada State Journal darkly warned that a few hundred young Indian warriors could easily "lay waste hundreds of homes and massacre their occupants before relief could reach them."5

As this sort of coverage suggests, the local press did a good deal to fan the crisis, though some newspaper editors portrayed the developing story in a sober and responsible way. The *White Pine News*, for instance, reminded readers that the Indians among them were peaceable and industrious, as well as poorly armed and provisioned, and dismissed the notion that the Indians were about to commence a war as "nonsensical." White readers (if not Indian ones) were reassured by the statement that the "poor Indian" was "fast disappearing, pursuant to the law of Manifest Destiny." Yet even the *White Pine News* advised residents of eastern Nevada, especially in thinly populated areas, to be armed and watchful and warned them of the "latent treachery in the aborigines' nature" disposing the Indians to "diabolical acts of villainy."⁶

Other newspapers such as the Walker Lake Bulletin and the Nevada State *Iournal* were far more alarmist in tone and equally replete with the racist attitudes toward "savages" that prevailed in that period. Although a critical point in Wovoka's teaching-destruction of the whites by divine intervention rather than Indian warfare-was by and large correctly reported, the Journal took the view that Indians excited by the Messiah craze were liable to attack regardless of doctrine ("When white people, in a civilized community, have their heads turned by the harangues of fanatics. Indians, ignorant and untutored, can not be expected to maintain their mental balance. . . . ").⁷ Intense concern was voiced over the large proportion of Indians in the state, a figure inflated in the Journal's pages from the ten percent of the population recorded in census reports to double that number. It was in sounding the alarm of approaching carnage by these mythical warrior hordes and magnifying minor episodes to threatening proportions that the press exacerbated tensions during the millennial winter. News of the tragedy at Wounded Knee seems to have been generally regarded as proof that hostilities with Indians aroused by the new religion were already underway.

Although the fears of a public frightened by sensational journalism and the religious excitement among the Indians had produced an explosive situation, several factors worked against the occurrence of a large-scale calamity in Nevada. The first was the presence of mature and knowledgeable leadership. During the winter of 1890-1891, Nevada was served by Acting Governor Frank Bell, the appointed Republican lieutenant governor who had assumed office when Governor Charles C. Stevenson became ill and died in September, 1890, and Roswell K. Colcord, the newly elected Republican governor who assumed office in January, 1891. Bell had supervised the construction of the Overland telegraph across Nevada in 1861; Colcord was a former mining engineer who had pursued his profession in Aurora, the Comstock. and Bodie. Both had lived through such major Indian conflicts as the Pyramid Lake War and the Owens River War. Though neither governor had much experience in state office, both were mature men (Bell was fifty and Colcord fifty-one) who had livd and worked in the West for some thirty years and were not inclined to panic when pressed with demands for military action. This shows clearly in the instructions from Governor Bell to Nye County Sheriff Wilson Brougher that accompanied the requested shipment of arms for protection against the Ghost Dancers. "I am instructed by the Governor to say to you," wrote the acting adjutant general, "that in case you have to distribute these arms that in doing so you will be particularly careful to whom they are given as it is essential that none but careful cool headed men should handle them as if put in the hands of rash and unthinking men trouble might be caused unnecessarily and damage done which could be avoided by cautious deliberation and anything leading to rashness or recklessness should be avoided for the good of all parties concerned."⁸

When Governor Colcord took office in January, this policy of restraint remained in force. Colcord sought no enhancement of the state's military capabilities in his inaugural message. He ignored a demand from *Silver State* (Winnemucca) that he should send troops to control the Indians in the Fort McDermitt area.⁹ He did not respond to the clamor in the press to break up the Ghost Dances. Most important of all, he forebore from requesting the president to send federal troops to Nevada.

The calm and restrained attitude of both governors was fortunately shared by the state's top military official, Acting Adjutant General C.H. Galusha, as his responses to the sheriffs and the local militias plainly attest. "I'm very glad to say there will be no occasion for any companies to take the field this year." he reassured one of the militia officers on November 26, 1890, "as the trouble if there was any (of which I have my doubts more than that caused by unprincipled parties selling whiskey to the Indians) has all disappeared and everything is 'all quiet on the Reese' at present and no likelihood of any trouble in the near future."10 Another letter suggests that instead of regarding the Ghost Dance as a new and extremely dangerous phenomenon, Galusha simply saw it as a more recent version of the dance ceremonials the Indians had periodically convened for years. In their efforts to keep the peace, Galusha and the governors were aided by equally responsible leadership among Nevada Indian chiefs and headmen, many of whom gave assurances of their peaceful intentions. Captain John, a Shoshone leader, pledged to the nervous citizens of Nye County that his people had no plans to make war and would help them resist any Indians who moved against them. Many eastern Nevada Indian leaders made similar declarations.¹¹

Like Governors Bell and Colcord, Nevada Indian agent C.C. Warner had also just taken office; but he, too, was another old time Nevadan who combined long experience in the West (and reputed service in the Indian wars) with deep sympathy for the Indians. Unlike his counterparts at the Sioux reservations, who did so much to exacerbate alarm and bring about military intervention, Warner bent every effort to calm the crisis. His policy toward Wovoka was summed up in a letter to ethnologist James Mooney, "I am pursuing the course with him of nonattention or a silent ignoring." Although he regarded the Ghost Dance Messiah as a clever charlatan, Warner steadfastly refused to arrest Wovoka ("I would give him no such notoriety") and denied that the Indians residing at the Pyramid and Walker reservations were heavily involved in the Ghost Dance. In a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in early February, he condemned "silly rumors" started by "people who should be more sensible" and flatly declared to his superior, "There is not the *slightest* foundation or cause for the scare."¹² In a public letter written in response to inflammatory remarks in the newspapers from both regular correspondents and an anonymous citizen calling himself "Jerusha Juniper," Warner characterized reports that the Indians were "in war paint" as "preposterous" and assured the uneasy that all the Indians at the Pyramid and Walker reservations had "a most decided opinion for peace and good will for the whites." He went on to say, "If by a miracle any trouble should arise, the responsibility wants to be placed not at the doors of the Indians, but of those who originate such uncalled for and absurd reports. "¹³

Warner's calm assessment of the situation was shared by W.J. Plumb, agent at the Western Shoshone Reservation in Nevada and Idaho. While Plumb acknowledged that at least 1,000 Indians from the reservation and the surrounding area had participated in an early November Ghost Dance, he reported, "I apprehend no trouble beyond the loss of time and the general demoralizing effect of these large gatherings of people." Plumb's threat to withhold a promised Christmas feast if a Ghost Dance were held on that day, coupled with his cogent argument that Ghost Dance were held on that day, coupled with his cogent argument that Ghost Dance. Plumb concluded, "I have no hope of breaking up their dances altogether, but I have strong hopes of controlling them."¹⁴

While this practice of distributing "substantials," or in less attractive parlance, bribery, to Indians who eschewed the Ghost Dance drew no apparent criticism, Warner's policy of "nonattention" incurred the wrath of ethnologist Mooney and alarmists such as "Jerusha Juniper," both of whom, from completely opposite points of view, were convinced that Warner erred in minimizing the importance of the Ghost Dance excitement. Mooney scathingly observed: "Here is an agent who has under his special charge . . . the man who has created the greatest religious ferment known to the Indians of this generation, a movement which had been engrossing the attention of the newspaper and magazine press for a year, yet he has never seen him. . . .^{"15} From this point in time, it is impossible to determine whether Warner actually underestimated the impact of the Ghost Dance at the Nevada reservations or was deliberately attempting to protect his "pet Indians," as "Jerusha Juniper" sarcastically alluded to them, from possible arrest, detention, relocation, and such tragedies as Wounded Knee; but it is instructive to contrast his approach with that of agents at the Sioux reservations in South

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Dakota who played a large part in creating a crisis where none would otherwise have existed. Unfounded statements that the Sioux were preparing for war from Perain Palmer, the new agent at the Cheyenne River Reservation, are considered largely responsible for the escalation of public fear of a Sioux outbreak. At Pine Ridge Reservation, the young and inexperienced agent Daniel Royer was bombarding Washington with letters and wires warning of an imminent Indian outbreak and calling for military intervention. At one point, he raced his team down the main street of Rushville, Nebraska shouting to the citizens, "Protect yourselves! The Sioux are rising!" Yet it is ironic to reflect that much of what these agents had to say in their dispatches ("Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy," "they are daily becoming more threatening and defiant," etc.)¹⁶ applied equally well to the Nevada Indians—if Warner had taken a similar view of the situation.

In addition to the good sense of leaders on both sides, another factor that worked against an outbreak of Indian-white hostilities was the absence of a military force on the scene. Since the Paiutes and Shoshones, unlike the Sioux, were no longer considered potentially hostile, no U.S. troops were then stationed in Nevada; and the state did not maintain a police force. Consequently, the only immediately available military forces were the local militias, none of which were strong enough to attempt disarming the Indians and compelling them to cease Ghost Dancing. On paper the local militias comprised a substantial force of 11,178 (almost every white man in the state between the ages of 18 and 44) that should in theory have been capable of controlling a population of 5, 156 Indians, that according to one sober estimate may have included no more than 600 able-bodied fighting men. But the militias were poorly equipped. The three rounds of ammunition issued to them annually by the state for target practice had probably been used by winter, and their yearly appropriation of guartermaster stores from the federal government amounted to only \$2,800.17 In addition, their training was in all likelihood uneven, and some apparently had little taste for Indian warfare. Press reports (subsequently denied) indicated that the Tuscarora guards had resigned and disbanded as soon as it appeared that their uniforms might entail more perilous service than ceremonial appearances in Fourth of July parades. Although the Tuscarora guards received a thorough lambasting from the press, their reluctance for battle probably had happier consequences for both settlers and Indians than the reckless bravado that was often a feature of past military disasters. During the Pyramid Lake War of 1860, volunteers sporting the slogan "an Indian for breakfast and a pony to ride" had rushed heedlessly into an Indian ambush and suffered heavy casualties.¹⁸ It was probably fortunate for everyone concerned that the militias included no incipient Custers, bent on glory at any cost.

Understandably chary of relying too heavily for protection upon a militia that included such "weak reeds," the Nevada legislature enacted a joint

resolution in March 1891, urgently requesting Congress to establish a military post at Hawthorne, winner over Reno in the legislative tug of war for the economic benefits connected to the proposed installation:

WHEREAS, The Piute Indians occupying the Walker Lake Indian Reservation, and congregating in the immediate vicinity thereof, to the number of four hundred or more, are evincing restlessness and manifesting hostile intentions, thereby causing grave apprehensions of impending danger to the whites in the adjacent country, who are numerically far inferior to the said Indians, and who would lose many lives and their property in the event of hostilities. . . .

WHEREAS, Should the present apprehension of hostilities in that vicinity prove to be groundless, the Indians of said Walker Lake Reservation may at any future time become aggressive and blood-thirsty and desolate the country adjacent to the said reservation . . . our Senators and Representatives in Congress are urgently requested to make an earnest effort to secure the establishment of a United States military post at the town of Hawthorne, Nevada, and the stationing of troops at said post.¹⁹

The Nevada congressional delegation may well have regarded this resolution with little sense of urgency. Senator William M. Stewart's correspondence books for the three-month period when the crisis was most intense (December 1890-February 1891) reveal communications to officials at the Nevada Indian reservations and many constituents in the "heart of the Indian country," but all are concerned with the usual bread and butter of politics bills, appropriations, appointments, pension claims, and so forth. Though Stewart both wrote and met with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in this period, the subjects of discussion were apparently of the same character. The only communication touching on an Indian problem was a response to a constituent seeking an appropriation for the relief of numerous starving Indians in the Fort McDermitt area. The threat of hostilities with the Indians is primarily notable for its absence from the Stewart correspondence. Under the circumstances, Congress took no action on the establishment of a military post.²⁰

The Nevada State Journal not only campaigned for a military post as a "great, in fact, absolute necessity" but also demanded the immediate dispatch of U.S. troops to Nevada on the grounds that a military presence would forestall hostilities with the Indians: "Like all savage and barbarous peoples, the Indians of Nevada respect force."²¹ On the contrary, Wounded Knee in 1890 had demonstrated quite the opposite—it was the military attempt to deal forcibly with Indian adherents to the new religion that produced the confrontation. Had the military not intervened to arrest chiefs Sitting Bull and Big Foot and attempted to compel the Sioux to cease Ghost Dancing, the Indian unrest of the millennial winter would probably have died down without incident.²² In retrospect, government inaction and military weakness proved more fortunate for Nevada than anyone realized at the time.

Ironically, despite the disposition of the Nevada press to magnify any sign

of Indian unrest, the violent incident that might have lit the powder keg passed unnoticed, perhaps because it occurred in remote Sylvania, a mining camp on the southern rim of Esmeralda County. Soon after New Year's Day a Ghost Dance had commenced on the crest of the nearby White Mountains. Among the white "squaw men" participating in the ritual was Andrew Jackson ("Jack") Longstreet, a frontiersman of mysterious origins with a well-notched Colt .44 who had been running a tent saloon in Sylvania. Longstreet spoke the Paiute language fluently and was regarded as a leader among the Indians. When a snowstorm forced the dancers to take temporary refuge in the Palmetto Mine, it was probably his influence that altered the normal course of the Ghost Dance ritual. Usually, Ghost Dance participants would shuffle and chant in concentric circles for long periods and finally fall to earth in hypnotic trances, during which they reported experiencing journeys to the land of the dead; on this occasion, the Ghost Dancers instead rushed out to rectify their grievances by force in the land of the living.²³

The first stop was Home Rule Cabin, the abode of a tough Nova Scotian named Charles Murphy, who, as the San Francisco Examiner delicately phrased it, had been known to "persuade a stage to stop and surrender to an emergency." Indian miners employed at Murphy's Tule Canyon mining operation had not always received their wages, and he was judged capable of making recompense in liquor if not in cash.

But Murphy was not easily parted from his cache of dark bottles. As soon as he heard the Indians whooping outside his cabin, Murphy arose from the dinner table and fired his shot gun out the window. "Hand me the sixshooter," he told his formidable old mother, and sent six more shots toward the Indians outside. Several answering shots snapped back from the darkness, but no rush on the cabin occurred. Apparently the small grudge against Murphy had been judged not worth the bloodshed that would ensue from an attack on Home Rule Cabin, and the Ghost Dancers had moved on to their real quarry—Robert Starrett, superintendent of the Sylvania Mine. Although Starrett was known to be well supplied with silver dollars, he had been paying the Indian miners in his employ with nothing more than scrip and promises.

While accounts of the ensuing events are somewhat conflicting, it appears that a small party led by Longstreet and another "squaw man" stole into Starrett's cabin at dawn while he was still asleep and abducted him. His naked body was then beaten with rods until he agreed to make out checks in "extravagant amounts" for the wages owed to the Indians by the mining company. The next day Starrett had recuperated sufficiently to ride into Independence, California and swear out warrants for the arrest of Longstreet and several other ring leaders, but by that time little could be done to assuage the angry superintendent's wounded pride or restore his lost funds. The Inyo County sheriff refused to guarantee that he would be able to arrest Longstreet for his part in the whole disreputable affair. As the officer put it, Longstreet was "a chronic case of refugee, and no Sheriff's posse has ever been able to corner him." 24

This prediction proved correct. Longstreet melted into the countryside and did not again appear in the news until the claim jumping at the Chispa Mine four years later. Murphy organized a militia company to resist further Indian unrest in the Sylvania area, but none occurred. Although the indignities inflicted upon Starrett could easily have fueled alarmist warnings that Ghost Dancing meant violence against whites, the Nevada press failed to pick up the incident from the *Examiner*. As winter passed, spring waned toward summer, and the millennium promised by Wovoka failed to arrive, the Ghost Dance excitement died down, and with it, press agitation and fears of an impending Indian massacre.

In Moon of Popping Trees, a penetrating analysis of the Sioux tragedy, Rex Allen Smith has observed, "it seems likely that with a combination of strong, knowledgeable agents and a great deal of patience, things would gradually have returned to normal."²⁵ That happy combination was present in Nevada, where the fortuitous absence of the military forestalled reliance upon coercive solutions and a measure of sheer good luck also played a part. Because no tragic confrontation occurred, men like Agent Warner, who helped to keep the peace, are less well remembered today than Indian agents elsewhere whose mistakes cost many lives, and the extreme tension of Nevada's last widespread Indian scare has now largely faded from our historical memory.

NOTES

¹ Walker Lake Bulletin (WLB), Jan. 28, 1891.

² Ibid.; Belmont Courier, Nov. 15, 1890, Jan. 31, 1891; Nevada State Journal (NSJ), Jan. 10-13, 1891.

³ References include: James Mooney, *The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890* (University of Chicago Press, 1965, originally published in 1896); Rex A. Smith, *Moon of Popping Trees* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975), esp. chs. 7 and 8; and Paul Bailey, *Wovoka: The Indian Messiah* (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1957).

⁴ WLB, Jan. 28, 1891; Chloride Belt (Candelaria), Dec. 17, 1890; NSJ, Jan. 8, 11, 15, and 17, 1891.

⁵ NSJ, Jan. 11, 1891; WLB, Jan. 28, 1891; White Pine News (WPN), Nov. 22, 1890; Captain J.G. Smart to Acting Adjutant General C.H. Galusha Jan. 12, 1891, adjutant general's correspondence books, Nevada State Division of Archives and Records, Carson City (the repository of all the Galusha correspondence hereafter cited).

⁶ WPN, Nov. 15, 1890; also see the Nov. 29, 1890 and Jan. 17, 1891 issues.

7 NSJ, Jan. 14, 1891; also see the Jan. 11 issue and the WLB.

⁸ Galusha to Sheriff W. Brougher, Dec. 9, 1890; on the governors' backgrounds, see Myrtle T. Myles, *Nevada's Governors* (Sparks, Nevada: Western Printing & Publishing, 1972), 42-52, and Sally S. Zanjani, "The Election of 1890: The Last Hurrah for the Old Regime," *Nevada Historical Society Quarterly*, XX (Spring, 1977), 46-56.

⁹ NSJ, Jan. 15, 1891; "Inaugural Message," Appendix to the Journals of the Nevada Senate and Assembly, 1891; unfortunately, the papers of Nevada's nineteenth century governors have not been preserved, so it is difficult to determine how much pressure Bell and Colcord were receiving from private citizens and local officials during the crisis.

¹⁰ Galusha to Capt. Rieber, Nov. 26, 1890.

¹¹ Galusha to Brougher, Dec. 9, 1890; Belmont Courier, Nov. 15, 1890; WPN, Nov. 28, 1890.

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¹² U.S. Indian Agent C.C. Warner to James Mooney, Oct. 12, 1891 in Mooney, *op. cit.*, 8; Warner to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Feb. 6, 1891, National Archives, Washington, D.C. During a previous stint as Indian agent in the early eighties, Warner had upheld Indian rights in a controversy with the railroads; see Russell R. Elliott, *Servant of Power: A Political Biography of Senator William M. Stewart* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1983), 132-35.

13 NSJ, Jan. 14, 1891.

¹⁴ Mooney, Ghost Dance, 50-51.

¹⁵ Ibid., 8.

16 Smith, Moon, 120-26, 163.

¹⁷ "Biennial Report of the Adjutant General," Appendix to the Journals of the Nevada Senate and Assembly, 1891, 27; Galusha to E.J. Harcourt, Nov. 19, 1890; Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Statistics for Nevada (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1913), 568, 580; WPN, Nov. 29, 1890.

¹⁸ NSJ, Jan. 15, 1891; on the Pyramid Lake War, see James W. Hulse, *The Nevada Adventure: A History* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1965), 89-91.

¹⁹ "Senate Concurrent Resolution and Memorial No. XXXIX," *Statutes of the State of Nevada*, 1891 (Carson City: State Printing Office, 1891), 210.

²⁰ William M. Stewart correspondence, Nov., 1890-Feb., 1891, Stewart collection, Nevada Historical Society, Reno; esp. see Stewart's letters to: Warner, Dec. 29, 1890; Plumb, Jan. 2 and Feb. 2, 1891; Charles McConnell, Feb. 2, 1891; and W.D.C. Gibson, Feb. 2, 1891.

²¹ NSJ, Jan. 10, 1891.

²² Smith, Moon, 152-163.

²³ Sally Zanjani, Jack Longstreet: Last of the Desert Frontiersmen (Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1988), 54-58.

²⁴ Ibid., 58.

²⁵ Smith, Moon, 120.